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التاريخ: 2022/03/10

حضرة السادة بورصة فلسطين المحترمين  
حضرة السادة شركات الأوراق المالية المحترمين  
حضرة السادة شركات التأمين المحترمين  
حضرة السادة شركات التأجير التمويلي المحترمين  
تحية طيبة وبعد،

الموضوع: تعميم قرار بشأن قوائم الدول مرتفعة المخاطر  
والدول تحت المتابعة المعززة.

بالإشارة الى الموضوع أعلاه، واستناداً إلى أحكام القرار بقانون رقم (20) لسنة 2015م وتعديلاته؛ بشأن مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب، وبناءً على القرار الصادر عن السادة وحدة المتابعة المالية رقم (2022/1) بشأن قوائم الدول مرتفعة المخاطر والدول تحت المتابعة المعززة.

ولحماية النظام المالي من اية مخاطر تتعلق بجرائم غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب أو انتشار التسليح، يطلب من كافة القطاعات الخاضعة لإشراف ورقابة الهيئة تنفيذ متطلبات القرار أعلاه، واتخاذ التدابير اللازمة بمقتضاه.

**كما وتنوه الهيئة**، لضرورة الأخذ بعين الاعتبار المخاوف المتعلقة بأوجه قصور أنظمة مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب للدول المدرجة في القائمة الرمادية وذلك عند اجراء التقييم الذاتي لمخاطر غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب. كما ويجب ان يتم تطبيق النهج القائم على المخاطر الذي يأخذ بعين الاعتبار كافة عوامل المخاطر المتعلقة بالعملاء، والمنتجات والخدمات والعمليات، وقنوات التسليم، والدول والمناطق الجغرافية بحيث تكون الإجراءات المتخذة متناسبة ومتسقة مع نتائج تحليل المخاطر المختلفة وطبيعة تلك المخاطر.

وتفضلوا بقبول فائق الاحترام

براق النابلسي

المدير العام

ديوان



- مرفق قرار رقم (2022/1) الصادر عن وحدة المتابعة المالية بتاريخ 2022/03/10.
- نسخة الإدارة العامة للأوراق المالية.
- نسخة الإدارة العامة للتأمين.
- نسخة الإدارة العامة للرهن العقاري والتأجير التمويلي.

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قرار رقم (2022/1)

صادر عن وحدة المتابعة المالية

بتاريخ 2022/03/10م

بشأن قوائم الدول مرتفعة المخاطر والدول تحت المتابعة المعززة

استناداً إلى احكام قرار بقانون رقم (20) لسنة 2015م بشأن مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب وتعديلاته، لا سيما الفقرة (16) من المادة (20)، وبناءً على قرار اللجنة الوطنية لمكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب رقم (8ج/2016) الصادر بتاريخ 2016/12/01م، بشأن تفويض وحدة المتابعة المالية بنشر قائمة الدول عالية المخاطر والتي تصدر بشكل دوري عن مجموعة العمل المالي (FATF)، ولاحقاً لما تقرر عن المجموعة منذ تاريخ 2020/02/21، وحتى تاريخ 2022/03/04م، وعطفاً على قرار اللجنة الوطنية لمكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب رقم (ت/2020/5) الصادر بتاريخ 2020/02/24م بشأن الدول مرتفعة المخاطر والدول تحت المتابعة المعززة، ولاحقاً الى قرار وحدة المتابعة رقم (2020/1) بتاريخ 2020/02/25م والقرارات اللاحقة له بشأن قوائم الدول مرتفعة المخاطر والدول تحت المتابعة المعززة. وبناءً على مقتضيات المصلحة العامة، تقرر ما يلي:

أولاً


## قائمة الدول مرتفعة المخاطر (القائمة السوداء)

استمرار العمل بالإجراءات المضادة تجاه الدول مرتفعة المخاطر والمطلوبة بموجب البند (ثانياً) من قرار وحدة المتابعة المالية رقم (2020/1)، حيث تتمثل قائمة الدول مرتفعة المخاطر بالدول الآتية:

1. جمهورية كوريا الديمقراطية الشعبية (كوريا الشمالية).
2. الجمهورية الإسلامية الإيرانية (إيران).



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## ثانياً

## قائمة الدول تحت المتابعة المعززة (القائمة الرمادية)

تعديل قائمة الدول تحت المتابعة المعززة (القائمة الرمادية) المنصوص عليها في قرار الوحدة رقم (2021/3) وذلك بحذف دولة (زيمبابوي) من القائمة، وإضافة دولة (الامارات العربية المتحدة) لتصبح القائمة كما بالجدول أدناه، والأخذ بعين الاعتبار المخاوف المتعلقة بأوجه القصور في أنظمة مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب لهذه الدول (وفقاً للملحق المرفق بهذا القرار) وذلك عند اجراء التقييم الذاتي لمخاطر غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب بما يشمل تحديد وتحليل وتقييم تلك المخاطر.

الترقيم	اسم الدولة	الترقيم	اسم الدولة
1	جمهورية ألبانيا	13	جمهورية نيكاراغوا
2	بربادوس	14	جمهورية باكستان الإسلامية (الباكستان)
3	بوركينافاسو	15	جمهورية بنما
4	مملكة كمبوديا	16	جمهورية الفلبين
5	جزر الكايمان	17	جمهورية السنغال
6	جمهورية هايتي	18	جمهورية جنوب السودان
7	جمايكا	19	الجمهورية العربية السورية (سوريا)
8	المملكة الأردنية الهاشمية (الأردن)	20	الجمهورية التركية
9	جمهورية مالي	21	جمهورية اوغندا
10	جمهورية مالطا	22	الإمارات العربية المتحدة
11	المملكة المغربية	23	الجمهورية اليمنية (اليمن)
12	جمهورية اتحاد ماينمار (ماينمار)	-	-





ثالثاً

التنفيذ

يجب على كافة المؤسسات المالية والأعمال والمهنة غير المالية المحددة، تنفيذ أحكام هذا القرار ويعمل به من تاريخ تعميمه.

مدير وحدة المتابعة المالية

أ. وائل إلفي

المرفق: المخاوف المتعلقة بأوجه القصور في نظام مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب.



## المرفق

المخاوف المتعلقة بأوجه القصور في نظام  
مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب

مرفق بقرار وحدة المتابعة المالية رقم (2022/1)  
بشأن قوائم الدول مرتفعة المخاطر والدول تحت المتابعة المعززة

المخاوف المتعلقة بأوجه القصور في أنظمة مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب في الدول

❖ القسم الأول: أوجه القصور من خلال تقارير التقييم (لكافة الدول):

يوضح هذا القسم، كيفية الوصول الى المخاوف المتعلقة بنظام مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب وتمويل انتشار التسلح لدى الدول المدرجة في القائمة الرمادية، إضافة الى كافة الدول الأخرى التي تخضع للتقييم المتبادل من قبل مجموعة العمل المالي أو المجموعات النظرية، ويمكن الوصول الى تلك المخاوف من الاطلاع على تقارير التقييم المتبادل المتعلقة بتلك الدول، والتقارير المتابعة اللاحقة لهذا التقرير.

وتحتوي تقارير التقييم المتبادل (mutual evaluation reports) وتقارير المتابعة (follow-up reports) المنشورة على موقع مجموعة العمل المالي أو مجموعة العمل المالي لمنطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا، على كافة أوجه القصور والاستنتاجات الرئيسية المتعلقة بنظام مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب في الدول المدرجة على قائمة المتابعة المعززة وكافة الدول الأخرى التي خضعت للتقييم، ويمكن الحصول على تلك وفق الآلية التالية:

أ. الوصول الى تقارير التقييم المتبادل باللغة الإنجليزية (لكافة الدول).

1. الدخول الى الموقع الالكتروني:

[www.fatf-gafi.org](http://www.fatf-gafi.org)

2. اختيار بند (publications) ثم (mutual evaluations)

3. البحث عن اسم الدولة باللغة الإنجليزية على نافذة البحث الموضحة بالصورة الموضحة جانباً.

ب. الوصول الى تقارير التقييم المتبادل باللغة العربية (للدول الخاضعة لتقييم مجموعة العمل المالي لمنطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا).

1. الدخول الى الموقع الالكتروني:

[www.menafatf.org/ar](http://www.menafatf.org/ar)

3. اختيار بند (التقييم المتبادل) ثم (تقارير التقييم - الجولة الثانية من

التقييم)، أو تقارير المتابعة.

4. اختيار التقرير من القائمة التي تظهر حسب اسم الدولة.

مرفق بقرار وحدة المتابعة المالية رقم (2022/1)  
بشأن قوائم الدول مرتفعة المخاطر والدول تحت المتابعة المعززة

❖ القسم الثاني: تنفيذ خطط العمل لمعالجة أوجه القصور

قدّمت الدول المدرجة على القائمة الرمادية التزاماً سياسياً عالياً لمعالجة أوجه القصور الاستراتيجية المتعلقة بأنظمة مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب، وما زالت تلك الدول تتخذ التزاماتها لمعالجة باقي أوجه القصور. وتوضح البنود ادناه المحاور الأساسية التي تعمل تلك الدول على معالجتها أو تلك التي تم معالجتها والتي تعتمد على أوجه القصور المحددة وفقاً لتقارير التقييم المتبادل وتقارير المتابعة، حيث يجب أخذها بعين الاعتبار سواء كانت سلبية أم إيجابية:

الدولة	المحاور الأساسية
<b>Albania</b>	<p>Since February 2020, when Albania made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Albania has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by finalizing the registration of real estate property and completing a long-term project to reduce the informal economy.</p> <p>Albania should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) establishing more effective mechanisms to prevent criminals from owning or controlling DNFBPs, including by implementing new laws on the regulation of real estate intermediaries and notaries; (2) ensuring that there are effective mechanisms for timely access by authorities to company beneficial ownership information, as well as appropriate penalties for non-compliance or the provision of false information, including by implementing new laws to increase the population of the beneficial owners registry and raise the level of administrative sanctions; (3) increasing the number of prosecutions for ML, especially in cases involving foreign predicate offences; and (4) demonstrating seizures and confiscations of assets linked to third-party and professional money launderers.</p> <p>The FATF encourages Albania to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible as all deadlines have now expired.</p>
<b>Barbados</b>	<p>Since February 2020, when Barbados made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Barbados has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by improving its understanding of vulnerabilities related to legal persons and legal arrangements. Barbados should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating an effective application of risk-based supervision of DNFBPs (except CTSPs); (2) taking appropriate measures to prevent legal persons and</p>

	<p>arrangements from being misused for criminal purposes, and ensuring that accurate and up-to-date basic and beneficial ownership information is available on a timely basis; (3) ensure its FIU's financial intelligence products further assist law enforcement authorities in investigating ML or TF; (4) demonstrating that ML investigations and prosecutions are in line with the country's risk profile and result in sanctions, when appropriate, and provide statistics or case studies demonstrating a reduction of any backlog of cases; (5) further pursuing confiscation in ML cases, including by seeking assistance from foreign counterparts.</p>
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	<p>Since February 2021, when Burkina Faso made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Burkina Faso has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by adopting and implementing follow-up mechanisms for monitoring actions in the national strategy. Burkina Faso will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) updating its understanding of ML/TF risks, including through the revision of the national risk assessment in line with the sectoral priorities identified in its national strategy; (2) seeking mutual legal assistance (MLA) and other forms of international cooperation in line with its risk profile; (3) strengthening of resource capacities of all AML/CFT supervisory authorities and implementing risk based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs; (4) maintaining comprehensive and updated basic and beneficial ownership information and strengthening the system of sanctions for violations of transparency obligations; (5) increasing the diversity of STR reporting; (6) enhancing the FIU's human resources through additional , hiring, training and budget; (7) conduct training for LEAs, prosecutors and other relevant authorities; (8) demonstrating that authorities are pursuing confiscation as a policy objective; (9) enhancing capacity and support for LEAs and prosecutorial authorities involved in combatting TF, in line with the TF National Strategy; and (10) implementing an effective targeted financial sanctions regime related to terrorist financing and proliferation financing as well as risk-based monitoring and supervision of NPOs.</p>
<b>Cambodia</b>	<p>In February 2019, Cambodia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies. Cambodia should take urgent action to fully address remaining measures in its action plan as all timelines have already expired. Cambodia should therefore continue to work on implementing</p>



	<p>its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) enhancing disseminations of financial intelligence to law enforcement authorities in connection with high-risk crimes; (2) demonstrating an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions in line with risk; (3) demonstrating an increase in the freezing and confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities, and property of equivalent value; (4) demonstrate that implementation of TFS related to PF is occurring by providing training to strengthen the skills of competent authorities to implement PF TFS, and enhance the understanding of sanctions evasion.</p> <p>The FATF again expresses significant concern that Cambodia failed to complete its action plan, which fully expired in January 2021. The FATF strongly urges Cambodia to swiftly demonstrate significant progress in completing its action plan by June 2022 or the FATF will consider next steps, which could include calling on its members and urging all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence to business relations and transactions with Cambodia</p>
<b>The Cayman Islands</b>	<p>In February 2021, the Cayman Islands made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. The Cayman Islands should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) imposing adequate and effective sanctions in cases where relevant parties (including legal persons) do not file accurate, adequate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information in line with those requirements; and (2) demonstrating that they are prosecuting all types of money laundering cases in line with the jurisdiction's risk profile and that such prosecutions are resulting in the application of dissuasive, effective, and proportionate sanctions.</p>
<b>Haiti</b> (Statement from June 2021)	<p>In June 2021, Haiti made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Haiti will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) developing its ML/TF risk assessment process and disseminating the findings; (2) facilitating information sharing with relevant foreign counterparts; (3) addressing the technical deficiencies in its legal and regulatory framework that impede the implementation of AML/CFT preventive measures and implementing risk-based AML/CFT supervision for all financial institutions and DNFBPs deemed to constitute a higher ML/TF risk; (4) ensuring basic and beneficial ownership information are maintained and accessible in a timely manner; (5) ensuring a better use of financial intelligence and other relevant information by competent</p>

	<p>authorities for combatting ML and TF; (6) addressing the technical deficiencies in its ML offence and demonstrating authorities are identifying, investigating and prosecuting ML cases in a manner consistent with Haiti's risk profile; (7) demonstrating an increase of identification, tracing and recovery of proceeds of crimes; (8) addressing the technical deficiencies in its TF offence and targeted financial sanctions regime; (9) conducting appropriate risk-based monitoring of NPOs vulnerable to TF abuse without disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activities.</p>
<b>Jamaica</b>	<p>Since February 2020, when Jamaica made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Jamaica has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by implementing on-going risk based supervision of DNFBPs and wider reforms increasing the use of financial intelligence in ML investigations and charges. Jamaica should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) including all FIs and DNFBPs in the AML/CFT regime and ensuring adequate, risk-based supervision in all sectors; (2) taking appropriate measures to prevent legal persons and arrangements from being misused for criminal purposes, and ensuring that accurate and up-to-date basic and beneficial ownership information is available on a timely basis to competent authorities; (3) taking proper measures to increase ML investigations and prosecutions, in line with the country's risk profile; and (4) implementing a risk-based approach for supervision of the NPO sector to prevent abuse for TF purposes.</p> <p>The FATF encourages Jamaica to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible as all deadlines have now expired.</p>
<b>Jordan</b> (Statement from October 2021)	<p>In October 2021, Jordan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in November 2019, Jordan has made progress on a number of the MER's recommended actions to improve its system, including by finalizing their National Risk Assessment (NRA). Jordan will work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) completing and disseminating the ML/TF risk assessments of NPOs, legal persons and virtual assets; (2) improving risk based supervision and applying effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions for noncompliance; (3) conducting training and awareness raising programs for DNFBPs on their AML/CFT obligations, particularly with regard to filing and</p>

	<p>submitting STRs; (4) maintaining comprehensive and updated basic and beneficial ownership information on legal persons and legal arrangements; (5) pursuing money laundering investigations and prosecutions, including through parallel financial investigations, for predicate offences in line with the risk identified in the NRA; (6) creating a legal obligation for confiscating instrumentalities used or intended to be used in ML crimes; (7) developing and implementing a legal and institutional framework for targeted financial sanctions; and (8) developing and implementing a risk-based approach for supervision of the NPO sector to prevent abuse for TF purposes.</p>
<p><b>Mali</b> (Statement from October 2021)</p>	<p>In October 2021, Mali made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in November 2019, Mali has made progress on a number of the MER's recommended actions to improve its system, including by adopting its National Risk Assessment (NRA). Mali will work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) disseminating the results of the NRA to all relevant stakeholders including by conducting awareness raising activities with the highest risk sectors; (2) developing and starting to implement a risk based approach for the AML/CFT supervision of all FIs and higher risk DNFBPs and demonstrating effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for noncompliance; (3) conducting a comprehensive assessment of ML/TF risks associated with all types of legal persons; (4) increasing the capacity of the FIU and the LEAs and enhancing their cooperation on the use of financial intelligence; (5) ensuring relevant competent authorities are involved in investigation and prosecution of ML; (6) strengthening the capacities of relevant authorities responsible for investigation and prosecution of TF cases; (7) establishing a legal framework and procedures to implement targeted financial sanctions; and (8) implementing a risk-based approach for supervision of the NPO sector to prevent abuse for TF purposes.</p>
<p><b>Malta</b></p>	<p>In June 2021, Malta made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. At its February 2022 Plenary, the FATF made the initial determination that Malta has substantially completed its action plan and warrants an on-site visit to verify that the implementation of Malta's AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation and improvement in the future. Malta has made the</p>

	<p>following key reforms: (1) continuing to demonstrate that beneficial ownership information is accurate and that, where appropriate, effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions, commensurate with the ML/TF risks, are applied to legal persons if information provided is found to be inaccurate; and ensuring that effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions are applied to gatekeepers when they do not comply with their obligations to obtain accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information; (2) enhancing the use of the FIU's financial intelligence to support authorities pursuing criminal tax and related money laundering cases, including by clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the Commissioner for Revenue and the FIU; and (3) increasing the focus of the FIU's analysis on these types of offences, to produce intelligence that helps Maltese law enforcement detect and investigate cases in line with Malta's identified ML risks related to tax evasion. The FATF will continue to monitor the COVID-19 situation and conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.</p>
<b>Morocco</b>	<p>In February 2021, Morocco made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Morocco has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by providing additional training and awareness raising to financial institutions and DNFBNs to detect suspicious cases and to file STRs. Morocco should continue to work to implement its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) improving risk-based supervision and taking remedial actions and applying effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for non-compliance; (2) ensuring that beneficial ownership information, including information of legal persons and foreign legal arrangements is adequate, accurate and verified; (3) increasing the diversity of suspicious transactions reporting; (4) cooperating and sharing relevant information on ML cases in a timely manner and establish asset seizing and confiscation procedures; and (5) monitoring and effectively supervising the compliance of FIs and DNFBNs with targeted financial sanctions obligations.</p>
<b>Myanmar</b>	<p>In February 2020, Myanmar made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies. Myanmar has taken some steps toward improving its AML/CFT regime, specifically training on proliferation financing targeted financial sanctions, but the progress has been limited.</p>

	<p>Myanmar should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating an improved understanding of ML risks in key areas; (2) demonstrating that onsite/offsite inspections are risk-based, and hundi operators are registered and supervised; (3) demonstrating enhanced use of financial intelligence in LEA investigations, and increasing operational analysis and disseminations by the FIU; (4) ensuring that ML is investigated/prosecuted in line with risks; (5) demonstrating investigation of transnational ML cases with international cooperation; (6) demonstrating an increase in the freezing/seizing and confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities, and/or property of equivalent value; (7) managing seized assets to preserve the value of seized goods until confiscation; and (8) demonstrating implementation of targeted financial sanctions related to PF.</p> <p>The FATF expresses concern with Myanmar’s limited progress with all deadlines having expired, and significant work remaining on the majority of its action plan including fundamental deficiencies that need to be addressed with respect to ML investigations and prosecutions and asset confiscation. The FATF again strongly urges Myanmar to swiftly complete its action plan by June 2022 or the FATF will decide the next steps for advising its members and jurisdictions on the AML/CFT concerns in Myanmar.</p>
<p><b>Nicaragua</b></p>	<p>In February 2020, Nicaragua made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GAFILAT to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Nicaragua has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by putting in place mechanisms to ensure that beneficial ownership information of legal persons and arrangements is maintained and obtained in a timely manner. Nicaragua should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its remaining strategic deficiencies, including by taking appropriate measures to prevent legal persons and arrangements from being misused for criminal purposes.</p> <p>The FATF encourages Nicaragua to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible as all deadlines have now expired.</p>
<p><b>Pakistan</b></p>	<p>Since June 2018, when Pakistan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen its AML/CFT regime and to address its strategic counter-terrorist financing-related deficiencies, Pakistan’s continued political commitment has led to significant progress across a comprehensive CFT</p>

	<p>action plan. Pakistan has completed 26 of the 27 action items in its 2018 action plan. The FATF encourages Pakistan to continue to make progress to address, as soon as possible, the one remaining item by continuing to demonstrate that TF investigations and prosecutions target senior leaders and commanders of UN designated terrorist groups.</p> <p>In response to additional deficiencies later identified in Pakistan's 2019 APG Mutual Evaluation Report (MER), in June 2021, Pakistan provided further high-level commitment to address these strategic deficiencies pursuant to a new action plan that primarily focuses on combating money laundering. Since June 2021, Pakistan has taken swift steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime and completed 6 of the 7 action items ahead of any relevant deadlines expiring, including by demonstrating that it is enhancing the impact of sanctions by nominating individuals and entities for UN designation and restraining and confiscating proceeds of crime in line with Pakistan's risk profile. Pakistan should continue to work to address the one remaining item in its 2021 action plan by demonstrating a positive and sustained trend of pursuing complex ML investigations and prosecutions.</p>
<p><b>Panama</b></p>	<p>In June 2019, Panama made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GAFILAT to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Panama has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by strengthening its understanding of the ML/TF risk of legal persons, as part of the corporate sector. However, Panama should take urgent action to fully address remaining measures in its action plan as all timelines have already expired. Panama should therefore continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) ensuring effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions in response to AML/CFT violations; (2) ensuring adequate verification, of up-to-date beneficial ownership information by obliged entities and timely access by competent authorities, establishing an effective mechanisms to monitor the activities of offshore entities, assessing the existing risks of misuse of legal persons and arrangements to define and implement specific measures to prevent the misuse of nominee shareholders and directors; and (3) demonstrating its ability to investigate and prosecute ML involving foreign tax crimes and continuing to provide constructive and timely international cooperation for such offences, and continuing to focus on ML investigations in relation to high-risk areas.</p> <p>The FATF again expresses significant concern that Panama failed to complete its action plan, which fully expired in January 2021. The FATF strongly urges Panama to swiftly demonstrate significant progress in completing its action plan by June 2022 or the FATF will consider next steps, which could include the FATF calling</p>

مرفق بقرار وحدة المتابعة المالية رقم (2022/1)  
 بشأن قوائم الدول مرتفعة المخاطر والدول تحت المتابعة المعززة

	on its members and urging all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence to business relations and transactions with Panama.
<b>Philippines</b>	Since June 2021, when the Philippines made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, the Philippines has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by increasing the resources of its FIU and utilising its TFS framework for TF, ahead of any relevant deadlines expiring. The Philippines should continue to work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) demonstrating that effective risk-based supervision of DNFBPs is occurring; (2) demonstrating that supervisors are using AML/CFT controls to mitigate risks associated with casino junkets; (3) implementing the new registration requirements for MVTs and applying sanctions to unregistered and illegal remittance operators; (4) enhancing and streamlining LEA access to BO information and taking steps to ensure that BO information is accurate and up-to-date; (5) demonstrating an increase in the use of financial intelligence and an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions in line with risk; (6) demonstrating an increase in the identification, investigation and prosecution of TF cases; (7) demonstrating that appropriate measures are taken with respect to the NPO sector (including unregistered NPOs) without disrupting legitimate NPO activity; and (8) enhancing the effectiveness of the targeted financial sanctions framework for both TF and PF.
<b>Senegal</b>	Since February 2021, when Senegal made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Senegal has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by providing training to the investigative and judicial authorities on the use of financial intelligence to identify and investigate ML/TF cases. Senegal should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) ensuring consistent understanding of ML/TF risks (in particular related to the DNFBP sector) across relevant authorities through training and outreach; (2) seeking MLA and other forms of international cooperation in line with its risk profile; (3) ensuring that Financial Institutions and DNFBPs are subject to adequate and effective supervision; (4) updating and maintaining comprehensive beneficial ownership information on legal persons and arrangements and strengthening the system of sanctions for violations of transparency obligations; (5) continuing to enhance the FIU's human resources to ensure that it maintains effective operational analysis capacities; (6) demonstrating that efforts aimed at strengthening detection mechanisms and reinforcing the capability to conduct ML/predicate offences investigations and prosecutions activities are sustained consistently in line with the Senegal's risk profile; (7) establishing comprehensive and standardised policies and procedures for identifying, tracing, seizing and confiscating proceeds and instrumentalities

	of crime in line with its risk profile; (8) strengthening the authorities understanding of TF risks and enhancing capacity and support for LEAs and prosecutorial authorities involved in TF in line with the 2019 TF National Strategy; and (9) implementing an effective targeted financial sanctions regime related to terrorist financing and proliferation financing as well as risk-based monitoring and supervision of NPOs.
<b>South Sudan</b>	In June 2021, South Sudan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. South Sudan has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by designating a competent authority for AML/CFT purposes. South Sudan will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) applying and engaging with ESAAMLG for membership and committing to undergo a mutual evaluation by ESAAMLG or other assessment body; (2) conducting a comprehensive review of the AML/CFT Act (2012), with the support of international partners, including technical assistance, to comply with the FATF Standards; (3) becoming a party to and fully implementing the 1988 Vienna Convention, the 2000 Palermo Convention, and the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention; (4) ensuring that competent authorities are suitably structured and capacitated to implement a risk-based approach to AML/CFT supervision for financial institutions; (5) developing a comprehensive legal framework to collect and verify the accuracy of beneficial ownership information for legal persons; (6) operationalizing a fully functioning and independent FIU; (7) establishing and implementing the legal and institutional framework to implement targeted financial sanctions in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions on terrorism and WMD proliferation financing; and (8) commencing implementation of targeted risk-based supervision/monitoring of NPOs at risk of TF abuse.
<b>Syria</b>	Since February 2010, when Syria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Syria has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Syria had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by criminalizing terrorist financing and establishing procedures for freezing terrorist assets. While the FATF determined that Syria has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will



	<p>continue to monitor the situation, and will conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.</p>
<p><b>Turkey</b>  (Statement from October 2021)</p>	<p>In October 2021, Turkey made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in October 2019, Turkey has made progress on a number of the MER's recommended actions to improve its system, including by: promulgating an overarching national strategy for authorities in charge of combatting ML and TF; establishing a beneficial ownership registry; developing the strategic analysis capacity within the FIU; increasing the level of seizures of smuggled cash across borders; revising sentences available for terrorist financing to ensure there is an incentive for law enforcement to investigate TF activity independently and alongside terrorism offences; and eliminating the delays in implementing targeted financial sanctions under UNSCRs related to terrorist financing and proliferation financing.</p> <p>Turkey will work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) dedicating more resources at the FIU to supervision of AML/CFT compliance by high-risk sectors and increasing on-site inspections overall; (2) applying dissuasive sanctions for AML/CFT breaches, in particular for unregistered money transfer services and exchange offices and in relation to the requirements of adequate, accurate, and up-to-date beneficial ownership information; (3) enhancing the use of financial intelligence to support ML investigations and increasing proactive disseminations by the FIU; (4) undertaking more complex money laundering investigations and prosecutions; (5) setting out clear responsibilities and measurable performance objectives and metrics for the authorities responsible for recovering criminal assets and pursuing terrorism financing cases and using statistics to update risk assessments and inform policy; (6) conducting more financial investigations in terrorism cases, prioritizing TF investigations and prosecutions related to UN-designated groups and ensuring TF investigations are extended to identify financing and support networks; (7) concerning targeted financial sanctions under UNSCRs 1373 and 1267, pursuing outgoing requests and domestic designations related to UN-designated groups, in line with Turkey's risk profile; (8) to fully implement a risk-based approach to supervision of non-profit organizations to prevent their abuse for terrorist financing, conducting outreach to a broad range of NPOs in the sector and engaging with their feedback, ensuring that sanctions applied are proportionate to any violations, and taking steps to ensure that supervision does not disrupt or discourage legitimate NPO activity, such as fundraising.</p>

	<p>The FATF continues to monitor Turkey’s oversight of the NPO sector. Turkey is urged to apply the risk-based approach to supervision of NPOs in line with the FATF Standards.</p>
<p><b>Uganda</b></p>	<p>In February 2020, Uganda made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Uganda should continue to work to implement its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) seeking international cooperation in line with the country’s risk profile; (2) developing and implementing risk-based supervision of FIs and DNFBNs; (3) ensuring that competent authorities have timely access to accurate basic and beneficial ownership information for legal entities; (4) demonstrating LEAs and judicial authorities apply the ML offence consistent with the identified risks; (5) establishing and implementing policies and procedures for identifying, tracing, seizing and confiscating proceeds and instrumentalities of crime; (6) demonstrating that LEAs conduct TF investigations and pursue prosecutions commensurate with Uganda’s TF risk profile; (7) addressing the technical deficiencies in the legal framework to implement PF-related targeted financial sanctions; and (8) implementing a risk-based approach for supervision of its NPO sector to prevent TF abuse. The FATF continues to monitor Uganda’s oversight of the NPO sector. Uganda is strongly urged to align the Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment for NPOs with the FATF Standards. This is needed to apply the risk-based approach to supervision of NPOs in line with the FATF Standards to mitigate unintended consequences.</p> <p>The FATF notes Uganda’s continued effort across its action plan, however a number of its action plan deadlines have expired or will soon expire. The FATF encourages Uganda to continue to work on implementing its action plan to address the above mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible.</p>
<p><b>The United Arab Emirates</b></p>	<p>In February 2022, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in February 2020, the UAE has made significant progress across its MER’s recommended actions to improve its system, including by finalizing a TF Risk Assessment, creating an AML/CFT coordination committee, establishing an effective system to implement targeted financial sanctions without delay, and significantly improving its ability to confiscate criminal proceeds and engage in international cooperation. Additionally, the UAE addressed or largely addressed more than half of the key recommended actions from the MER.</p>

	<p>The UAE will work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) demonstrating through case studies and statistics a sustained increase in outbound MLA requests to help facilitate investigation of TF, ML, and high-risk predicates; (2) identifying and maintaining a shared understanding of the ML/TF risks between the different DNFBP sectors and institutions; (3) showing an increase in the number and quality of STRs filed by FIs and DNFBPs; (4) achieving a more granular understanding of the risk of abuse of legal persons and, where applicable, legal arrangements, for ML/TF; (5) providing additional resources to the FIU to strengthen its analysis function and enhance the use of financial intelligence to pursue high-risk ML threats, such as proceeds of foreign predicate offenses, trade-based ML, and third-party laundering; (6) demonstrating a sustained increase in effective investigations and prosecutions of different types of ML cases consistent with UAE's risk profile; and (7) proactively identifying and combating sanctions evasion, including by using detailed TFS guidance in sustained awareness-raising with the private sector and demonstrating a better understanding of sanctions evasion among the private sector.</p>
<b>Yemen</b>	<p>Since February 2010, when Yemen made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Yemen has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Yemen had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by: (1) adequately criminalizing money laundering and terrorist financing; (2) establishing procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets; (3) improving its customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting requirements; (4) issuing guidance; (5) developing the monitoring and supervisory capacity of the financial sector supervisory authorities and the financial intelligence unit; and (6) establishing a fully operational and effectively functioning financial intelligence unit. While the FATF determined that Yemen has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.</p>

❖ القسم الثالث: الدول التي تم حذفها من القائمة الرمادية

Jurisdiction No Longer Subject to Increased Monitoring by the FATF	
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	<p>The FATF welcomes Zimbabwe's significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime. Zimbabwe has strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and addressed related technical deficiencies to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in October 2019. Zimbabwe is therefore no longer subject to the FATF's increased monitoring process.</p> <p>Zimbabwe should continue to work with ESAAMLG to improve further its AML/CFT system, including by ensuring its oversight of NPOs is risk-based and in line with the FATF Standards.</p>